And apparently, intrinsically worthless gifts (e.g. an engagement ring?) are great signals.

THE SETUP:

I will base my analysis on a simple two-players model, which can be extended to create love triangles, quadrangles, etc… We have players A and B, who have concave utility functions, and hence are both risk-averse (i.e. they prefer certainty over an uncertain prospect). People are risk-averse to different degrees, and this will affect the payoffs each player faces, and as a result, the way the game is played. In this game, I will assume that both players are very risk-averse (which is true in most cases). Both players are trying to maximise their payoffs.

Firstly nature chooses whether player A will like player B (we have an information set). The subjective probabilities (something B may believe in) that A likes B and A does not like B are p and (1-p) respectively. This probability will affect the final equilibrium as shown later. Player B really fancies player A, but does not know whether player A will reciprocate. Player B has two strategies: profess and not profess his/her love. Player A’s action is to reciprocate or not reciprocate. However, player A will only reciprocate if nature has made him/her like B and vice versa, i.e. A cannot determine whether he/she will reciprocate. Each player’s payoff will depend on where player B is in the game, and what he/she chooses to do. The potential payoffs are as follows:

1) Player A reciprocates and player B professes: A gets 20 and B gets 20 (both players end up happily together, yay!!!).

2) Player A reciprocates and player B does not profess (sad times hah?): A gets 0 (he/she will never find out that he/she could have been a lot happier, but this can not be treated as a loss either) and B gets -10 for being an idiot (a rational fool) and not professing.

3) Player A does not reciprocate and player B professes (the worst thing ever right?): A gets -10 because suddenly he/she is facing an incredibly awkward situation, which clearly causes a lot of distress (like you need to be nice to that other person, explain why you will not reciprocate blah blah blah), B gets -100 for taking the risk whilst being so risk-averse (in other words for being an irrational fool). This is the most embarrassing scenario for both players.

4) Player A does not reciprocate and player B does not professes (a really boring scenario): A gets 0 again for very similar reasons (the lack of knowledge means he/she will never find out that he/she could have been a lot more stressed), B gets -5 for being a rational fool again (he/she will forever question whether A would have reciprocated).

It is probably easier to see the payoffs if you just draw the normal and extensive forms of the game.

POSSIBLE EQUILIBRIA:

Note that there is no strictly dominant strategy in this version of the game due to player B being very risk-averse.

We now look at best responses. It is pointless trying to look for A’s best responses because whether he/she reciprocates is decided by nature. Thus, we look for B’s best responses:

Best response for B given A reciprocates = profess.

Best response for B given A does not reciprocate = not profess.

Thus, we have two equilibria: (reciprocate, profess) = (20,20), (not reciprocate, not profess) = (0,-5). These are not strictly Nash’s equilibria as A’s action is predetermined by nature. Clearly though, the first equilibrium brings more utility to both players.

THE EASIER SOLUTION (i.e. under perfect information):

If we have a third party to provide (signal) player B information about his/her position in the game, then the game is pretty straight forward. Player B, knowing at which node he/she is, will be able to make the best decision for himself/herself. There will be two Nash equilibria. If player B knows that player A will reciprocate, then he/she will profess, making both players happy. On the other hand, if player B knows for sure that player A will not reciprocate, he/she will not profess and avoid the potential embarrassment. This happens sometimes (as I have seen recently), but most of the time people are in the dark about whether the other person like him/her or not.

THE SOLUTION UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION:

There are no mixed strategies in this game as player B can profess only once. However, it is probably possible to have mixed strategies if signalling is introduced. Since B knows nothing about A’s feeling, he/she will have to form expected utility from professing and not professing:

E [U(B)/B professes] = 20p – 100(1-p) = 120p – 100

E [U(B)/B does not profess] = -10p – 5(1-p) = -5p – 5

In order for B to profess, the first equality must be greater than the second. Basic calculations give that p must be greater than 0.76. However, remember what I said in the beginning about p being a subjective value and B being very risk-averse, most people will not say that the probability that someone likes them is that high (unless they have better knowledge after interacting).

SIGNALLING?

Signalling in this game can be slightly more complicated as after player B sends a signal, player A will likely send a signal back, and both players will have to form beliefs functions. Sending a signal can incur costs (say buying flowers and presents or trying to look more physically attractive) or no costs (just showing affection). The signal also may or may not increase the probability that player A will reciprocate player B’s feeling. This is probably too difficult for me to analyse right now, so I will leave this for another note in the near (indefinite) future.

MORE PLAYERS?

We have never done anything like this in the lectures, and my brain is melting… so I will go and write a blues on my piano! But I hope that everyone has seen that love is a really complicated game because people are just rational fools!

Iceland has been the world’s whipping boy for the last few years.  The collapse of its banking system uncovered huge international systemic failures leading to the economic crisis.  The snowy nation has had a rough time of it.  But as we begin 2011, I ask the question, are they really still in that much trouble?  Figures released by the International Monetary Fund in December 2010 showed that Iceland’s GDP grew by 1.2% in the third quarter, ending the recession caused by the actions of those in its banking sector.  What about those European countries still in economic strife?

In direct contrast to the actions taken by almost all other western countries and most significantly Ireland, Iceland let its banks fail.  It was able to do so because the international risk of contagion is comparably lower than many of the European countries currently receiving bail-outs.  This forced foreign creditors and the banks themselves to foot the bill of failure, rather than the taxpayer.  Essentially, Iceland stuck to free market principles.  Those institutions that operated in an economically viable manner were able to survive; those that chose to take on too many liabilities in foreign currency must face the consequences.  In a system such as banking where when times are good, the mechanisms of capitalism and free market economics define the actions of agents in market, why should those mechanisms not also define what happens when it goes wrong?  In addition to the economic reasoning, there is also the moral issue of the taxpayer having to pay for the mistakes of a small elite.  The actions of many other governments in bailing out the banks served as an attempt to prop up an already unsustainable bubble.  These actions have exacerbated existing public finance problems further, the implications of which are to be felt by those who have not caused the problem.

During the recession Iceland’s economy shrank 11 – 15% depending on your source, but it did so with inflation peaking at 18%, which devalued its debt.  The soaring inflation was furthermore caused by the Icelandic central bank’s decision to halve the value of its currency, the Kroner.  The difference in terms of inflation between Iceland and those euro-zone countries thought to be in the worst economics position, the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain), is quite stark.  Iceland’s inflation soared whilst Ireland, for example, is still going through through a sustained period of deflation

Iceland’s inflation is now down to a respectable 3%, hence interest rates are now at 4.5% from an 18% peak.  These inflation rates are, however, higher than the PIGS.  Iceland’s debt situation is also looking up.  Forecasts for 2011 predict a deficit of 6.3% which will soon turn to surplus approaching the mid-point of the decade.  The IMF said Iceland has turned a corner and that its economic performance “compares favourably against other countries hard hit by the crisis”.

Iceland’s current account balance suffered greatly at the beginning of the crisis with the nation running a 26% of GDP trade deficit with the rest of the world, which is much greater than any of the PIGS.  However, due to the high inflation rates and devaluation of its currency, the trade deficit in 2010 fell to just 0.9% of GDP, with a surplus forecasted in 2011.  Comparably, the PIGS are still running significant deficits approaching and exceeding 10% of GDP.  The long-term effects of these deficits are yet to be seen.  One thing is clear, the PIGS do not have the monetary sovereignty of Iceland and hence cannot devalue their debt, they must in effect, toe the economic line of the European Monetary Union and European Central Bank.

Many have portrayed the path chosen by Iceland and subsequent recovery as a model for other beleaguered economies, such as the PIGS group in the EU.  However, such comparisons must be contextualised.  Iceland’s economy is comparably tiny and would have little chance of bringing the entire world economy down if it walked away from its liabilities compared to the aforementioned PIGS.  Defaulting in one of those economies would risk contagion throughout the euro zone and possibly beyond.

Iceland’s monetary independence from the European Monetary Union has been sighted by many as a possible reason for its recent good performance.  Having experienced the worst financial crisis in memory, the country has emerged ahead of many of its contemporaries having endured less punishment than many EU member states.  Greece and Ireland have already been forced to accept bail-outs, and it appears Portugal will soon follow with an €80bn rescue package mooted.

But how sustainable is this recovery?  Iceland’s public debt has reached in excess of 115% of GDP, over four times what it was in 2007.  Furthermore, Government bonds issued in foreign currency are becoming more and more expensive to repay due to the devaluation of the kroner.  Domestic austerity was aided by this devaluation and the subsequent increase in inflation; however, many commentators have indicated this had little to do with the recent return to positive growth.  The turnaround is attributed to the return to current account surplus from deficit.  Moreover, the aforementioned debt burden is not only applicable to government finance; house prices have plummeted in the crisis leaving many homeowners in negative equity.  By no means is Iceland out of the woods, its current account turnaround from deficit to surplus has been accredited to falling imports rather than a surge in exports.  More tough times are ahead.

The implications of bail-outs on the PIGS are also uncertain.  What is obvious is the political motivation behind their economic choices; the European Union needs the single currency.  It is those with vested interests in the Union that have the most to lose; there is an unnerving air of inevitability in what is happening.  Interest rates are remaining low, aimed at a sluggish Germany, whilst those euro-zone countries experiencing increasing inflation desperately need interest rates to rise.  Where the European project falls down is, in throwing hugely different nation economies under a single monetary policy, it lacked the complete supranational economic governance and social mobility required.

On balance, Iceland has taken a radical path of devaluation which saw violent shifts in economic measures, which all looked terrible whilst it was happening.  It may however appear preferable to the long-term damage that may be seen in those countries which have chosen austerity, debt deflation and bail-outs, but like driving a car using only the rear-view mirror, we will not know until it has happened.

About the author: Harry is a fist year undergraduate studying Politics and Economics (BA) at the University of Leicester.

Recently, the Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) celebrated its 21^st Birthday by holding a series of lectures at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). The chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, Olivier Blanchard, gave the first lecture on the state of the world economy. Last Tuesday, the second lecture of the series was given by Professor John Van Reenen on the topic of restoring economic growth.

The Economics Network received an invitation to attend both lectures, and as a new guy on the job, I was appointed to go. However, being a second year student with a very busy schedule means I could only attend one of the lectures. Since I was doing economic growth as part of my macro course, I decided to go to the latter lecture.

I arrived in London quite late, but managed to quickly find my way to the lecture theatre in the LSE’s Old Building where the talk was held. The CEP has reserved a front row seat for me, so not only did I have the best view; I also managed to take many photos. There was a brief introduction of John Van Reenen by Stuart Corbridge before the lecture started.

John divided the lecture into three sections: the problems we currently face, the sources of growth and the policies we need. He started by saying the beginning of the current recession was a lot worse than the Great Depression; however, the government has not made the same mistakes it did in the 20s. Bank capitalisation, loose monetary policy and stimulus packages instead of spending cuts and tax raises have resulted in a much faster recovery for the UK. He also stressed that accelerated budget cuts proposed by the current coalition government will harm the economy in both short and long terms.

The three main sources of growth identified by John in his lecture were: technological innovation, management practices and microeconomic structural reforms. The main accent was made on the link between productivity and management. John argues that productivity growth is what matters, not absolute growth of GDP. Increases in productivity will drive real wages and consumption up, which in turn can
facilitate distribution. He also made a very interesting point about happiness. Current economic theory focuses on maximising income and consumption, but John thinks that after a certain level, addition to growth will not lead to more happiness. In my opinion, this is definitely something economists could focus more on.

He went on to analyse productivity in the UK. According to the findings, the UK’s relative productivity has improved compared to France and Germany. However, there is still a big gap relative to the US. John argues that this is all down to management practices. His data shows that the US has very few badly managed firms, hence, it has high productivity. On the other hand, in developing countries where there are many family businesses, management is much worse. John thinks that competition in the labour market ultimately leads to better selection of managers, which has a great impact on how firms’ productivity.

So what can we do to restore growth? The lecture concludes that structural reforms and macro policies should do the trick. Things like competition policy, public sector planning and better human capital management at the low end (apprenticeship scheme) are going to improve productivity in the long run. Finally, John argues that the austerity measures proposed by the current government will affect long-term employment as private sector cannot speedily adjust to the fiscal shock.

Here are the links to the webcasts of the two lectures if you want more:

Lecture 1: The State of The World Economy (Olivier Blanchard)

Lecture 2: Restoring Growth (John Van Reenen)

About the CEP

The CEP is an interdisciplinary research centre at the LSE Research Laboratory. It was established by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) in 1990 and is now one of the leading economic research groups in Europe. Its current Director is Professor John Van Reenen.

The CEP studies the determinants of economic performance at the level of the company, the nation and the global economy by focusing on the major links between globalisation, technology and institutions (above all the educational system and the labour market) and their impact on productivity, inequality, employment, stability and wellbeing. Its researches have affected numerous Labour policies, in particular the apprenticeship scheme.

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Highly educated parents responded more strongly to the controversial study linking the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine to the development of autism in children. That is the central finding of new research by Professor Dan Anderberg and colleagues presented at the Royal Economic Society’s 2008 annual conference.

Whats more, the study finds, these parents were less likely to have their children vaccinated against other diseases after the controversy, not just MMR. Since there was never any suspicion of doubt about other vaccines, this may have put the health of their children at risk.

The publication of medical research linking the MMR vaccine to autism in The Lancet in February 1998 sparked a decade-long controversy about the triple jab. Following the initial publication, the uptake rate of the MMR vaccine dropped from 92% in 1997/98 to 80% in 2003/04.

The new report examines how the response to the MMR controversy varied between parents with different levels of education. It reveals that:

• Before 1998, highly educated parents were up to 8% more likely to take up the MMR vaccine than parents with lower education.
• By 2002, this gap had not only closed; it had actually been reversed, with highly educated parents being 2-3% less likely to accept the MMR vaccine.
• Most of the relative decline in the MMR uptake by highly educated parents occurred soon after the controversy broke when the media coverage was still relatively low.
• After the increased media attention in 2001 and 2002, there were no discernible differences in trends across educational groups.
• The controversy also appears to have had effects on the uptake of other childhood vaccines: after 1998, highly educated parents also reduced their relative uptake of other non-controversial childhood vaccines.

The original research publication described a set of bowel symptoms and suggested a link to autism. The study included eight children whose parents said they had developed normally until they were given the MMR, and then had begun to regress. Dr Andrew Wakefield, the lead researcher suggested that children should be given the three vaccines separately rather than the combined MMR jab.

In the following years, a substantial body of research failed to verify any link between the vaccine and autism, and successive research reviews concluded that the vaccine was safe. The controversy nevertheless led many parents to worry, and the MMR uptake rate fell far below the 95% immunity rate required to stop measles from being able to spread.

The new report uses data on the uptake of immunisations collected at the Health Authority area level, which the authors combine with population characteristics from the Health Survey for England. The authors also use data from the Millennium Cohort Survey, which contains information on 8,000 English children due to obtain the MMR at the height of the controversy.

The finding that more educated parents had, at the peak of the controversy, a lower uptake rate is remarkable: generally higher educated parents are more likely to vaccinate their children.

The relative decline in uptake by highly educated parents also potentially has wider significance. Generally speaking, individuals with more education have better health. This is possibly because they are better informed about how to achieve better health outcomes. The finding that highly educated parents were the first to react to the information that the MMR had potential side effects is consistent with this hypothesis.

More puzzling is the finding that highly educated parents also reduced their uptake of other non-controversial childhood vaccines. One explanation for this is that they reacted to the overload theory, which states that too many vaccines, and multi-component vaccines in particular, could potentially be harmful to infants, a theory that was expressed at the time by Dr Wakefield and some of his colleagues.

Notes for editors: Health and Knowledge: The UK Measles, Mumps and Rubella Controversy by Dan Anderberg, Arnaud Chevalier and Jonathan Wadsworth was presented at the Royal Economic Societys annual conference at the University of Warwick, 17-19 March 2008.

The authors are at Royal Holloway, University of London. Arnaud Chevalier and Jonathan Wadsworth are also members of the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics.

For further information: contact Dan Anderberg on 01784-414082 (email: Dan.Anderberg@rhul.ac.uk); Arnaud Chevalier on 01784-414971 (email: arnaud.chevalier@rhul.ac.uk); Jonathan Wadsworth on 01784-443464 (email: j.wadsworth@rhul.ac.uk); or Romesh Vaitilingam on 07768-661095 (email: romesh@compuserve.com).

Read more research by Dan Anderberg at EconPapers. Intute: Social Sciences features more Internet resources on the topic of health economics.

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Mothers who smoke during pregnancy will have smaller babies. But much of the harm is due to unobservable traits of the mother. If mums stub it out by the time they are five months pregnant, the damage is as good as undone.

At the same time, the lasting harm to babies is greatest if the mothers have low education. So a much more holistic approach to improving child health in pregnancy is needed to help thousands of children break out of the poverty trap.

These are the conclusions of extensive new research by Emma Tominey, presented to the Royal Economic Society’s 2007 annual conference at the University of Warwick, 11-13 April.

Babies born to women who smoke will typically be 5.4% (6.5oz) lighter than other babies. But around half of this damage is because of unobservable traits of the mother. This means that stopping mothers smoking during pregnancy is important, but it is only half of the battle.

So while the effects of being a small baby stay with a child throughout its life, affecting its health, education and earnings potential, stopping a mother from smoking must be combined with helping her to be healthier in other areas of her life.

But for the harm that remains, the low educated mothers are hardest hit. Children born to mothers who left school at the age of 16 suffer double the harm for each cigarette smoked. The government must target its policy directly at these low educated families.

Women who do smoke in the early stages of pregnancy should not be ‘written off’ as ‘too late’. Surprisingly, the research shows that the harm to the baby is essentially reduced to zero if the mother quits by month five of the pregnancy.

This is much longer than conventional wisdom and previous research has suggested and tells us there’s more time than we thought to help the mothers change their behaviour during pregnancy.

The study is based on research into the lives of 6,500 children and their mothers, and went into exceptional detail of the mother’s lifestyle over her lifetime. The mothers were tracked from their child’s birth until the age of 42.

The research suggests that while previous studies have identified a link between smoking and low birth weight, none has looked in such depth at whether the experiences of the mother can alter this and how the harm accumulates during pregnancy.

The study calls on the government to alter radically its policy on helping pregnant women quit smoking, developing a more holistic approach to improving the health of these children during pregnancy and targeting the children of low educated mothers.

Notes for editors: Maternal Smoking During Pregnancy and Child Birth Weight by Emma Tominey was presented at the Royal Economic Society’s 2007 annual conference at the University of Warwick, 11-13 April.

Emma Tominey is at University College London.

For further information: contact Romesh Vaitilingam on 07768-661095 (email: romesh@compuserve.com).

Read more papers by Emma Tominey at EconPapers and search for more Internet resources on the issue of Women and Economics at Intute: Social Sciences.

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Providing family planning services for young people has little impact on pregnancy rates and may have contributed to the dramatic increase in rates of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) among young people. That is the conclusion of research presented at the Royal Economic Society annual conference by Professor David Paton of the Nottingham University Business School.

The research casts further doubt on the wisdom of the Government’s Teenage Pregnancy Strategy, following on from the announcement in February 2002 that the latest figures show an increase in teenage pregnancy rates, following several years of decline.

Since the start of the Teenage Pregnancy Strategy in 1999, there has been a major expansion of family planning services in the community aimed specifically at young people. Although teenage pregnancy rates in England have decreased somewhat since 1999, diagnosis rates of sexually transmitted infections have rocketed by 24.3%.

Professor Paton’s research looks at every health authority in England to see whether those areas that have increased family planning services for young people the most have also experienced the biggest decrease in pregnancy rates.

In fact, there is almost no correlation at all, even when a range of other social and economic factors are taken into account. The research also demonstrates that controversial schemes to provide the morning after pill to teenagers free of charge at pharmacists have not reduced teenage conceptions. In contrast, areas with bigger increases in family planning services have experienced significantly bigger increases in sexually transmitted infections among teenagers.

Professor Paton comments:

‘One of the problems with research on sexually transmitted infections is that we only have data on diagnoses and not on actual infections. With some of these infections, most notably chlamydia, there are often no symptoms at all. It could be that the increase in diagnosis rates just reflects the fact more young people are aware about diseases like chlamydia and are getting themselves tested.’

‘In fact, the notable feature about my results is that I found a significantly positive correlation between increases in family planning services and increases both in rates of chlamydia and in rates of those sexually transmitted infections where the symptoms are more noticeable.’

One explanation for these results is that easier access to family planning for young people may have been partly responsible for the increase in risky sexual behaviour among young people. The increase in this risk-taking behaviour may then have outweighed any positive impact of family planning policies.

The research suggests that economic and social factors, such as improved levels of educational achievement, are the factors that are most likely to affect teenage pregnancy rates.

Professor Paton believes that policy-makers can learn important lessons from his research:

When you introduce policies that seem to be obvious, it is important to factor in the possibility that the policies may actually cause people to change how they behave.

In this case, it appears that some measures aimed at reducing teenage pregnancy rates induced changes in teenage behaviour that were large enough not only to negate the intended impact on conceptions, but to have an adverse impact on another important area of sexual health sexually transmitted infections.

Notes

Random Behaviour or Rational Choice? Family Planning, Teenage Pregnancy and STIs by David Paton will be presented at the Royal Economic Society’s 2004 Annual Conference at the University of Wales Swansea on Monday 5 April.

David Paton is Professor in Industrial Economics at Nottingham University Business School.

STI rates are diagnoses among all teenagers at GUM clinics in England per 10,000 young people aged 15-19.

The latest data for teenage pregnancy relate to 2002 and were released in Health Statistics Quarterly on 26 February 2002. The rate of conceptions to girls under 18 was 42.6 per 1,000 in 2002, compared to 42.3% in 2001.

For Further information contact Romesh Vaitilingam on 0117-983-9770 or 07768-661095 (email: romesh@compuserve.com).

Related information

You can find other publications by this author, related research and citations from IDEAS and you can search for more Internet resources on the topic of STIs on SOSIG.

Economics in Action is a collaboration between the Royal Economic Society, the Economics Network of the Higher Education Academy and SOSIG, the Social Science Information Gateway. It forms part of the Why Study Economics initiative.

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Economists at Nottingham University Business School and Nottingham Trent University claim to have found a way to beat the bookies and make money out of spread betting.

In a paper presented at the Royal Economic Society’s Annual Conference, Dr David Paton and Dr Leighton Vaughan Williams show that punters can take advantage of different odds quoted by spread betting companies.

The two economists investigated returns to spread bets on one of the most popular markets, the number of bookings points in Premier League football matches. Dr Vaughan Williams explained:

‘Punters using the system pinpointed by our research would have won in more than 60% of matches examined over the last two seasons. The key to the system is identifying those cases where one bookmaker is offering prices out of line with their competitors.’

The possibility of betting arbitrages – buying high with one company and selling low with another to make a sure profit – has long been well known to punters. But such cases are increasingly difficult to find and spread bookmakers are known to restrict the amount of money that can be bet when an arbitrage position is open.

The two economists describe cases where companies offer prices that are different but not necessarily far enough apart for an arbitrage as Quasi-arbitrages or Quarbs. Dr Paton commented:

‘Quarbs are more common than true arbitrages, and spread bookmakers are much less likely to restrict the number of bets on them. Although betting on a Quarb does not guarantee you a profit, we found 140 cases during the last two Premier League seasons. Of these, 86 would have been winning bets and only 50 would have lost. A punter staking a modest £5 per point in each case would have won almost £5,000 over the two years.’

Despite the good news for punters, Dr Vaughan Williams adds a cautionary note:

‘Our research shows that, by betting sensibly, punters really can turn the odds in their favour. But they should remember that spread betting is notoriously volatile and it is possible to lose a lot of money in a short period of time.’

Notes

Quarbs and Efficiency in Spread Betting Markets: Can You Beat the Book? by David Paton and Leighton Vaughan Williams was presented at the Royal Economic Society’s 2002 Annual Conference at the University of Warwick.

Paton is Senior Lecturer in Industrial Economics, Nottingham University Business School, Jubilee Campus, Wollaton Road, Nottingham; Vaughan Williams is Head of Economics Research, Department of Economics and Politics, Nottingham Trent University, Burton Street.

For Further Information contact Romesh Vaitilingam on 07768-661095 (email: romesh@compuserve.com)

Related information

You can find other publications by these authors, related research and citations from IDEAS and you can search for more Internet resources on the topic of Gambling on SOSIG.

Economics in Action is a collaboration between the Royal Economic Society, the Economics Network of the Higher Education Academy and SOSIG, the Social Science Information Gateway. It forms part of the Why Study Economics initiative.